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London Emergency Services Liaison Panel

Major Incident PROCEDURE MANUAL

1999/2000





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The contents of this Manual have been drafted in accordance with the latest agreed procedures of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Association (CACFOA), the Ambulance Service Association (ASA), London boroughs and the Home Office. Extensive consultation has also been undertaken with the military, voluntary services and emergency services of surrounding county areas.

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London Fire & Civil Defence Authority

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Section 1

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 The procedures adopted by each of the emergency services in response to a major incident are understandably devoted to the role of the service concerned. The purpose of this document is to describe the agreed procedures and arrangements for the effective co-ordination of their joint efforts. In this way the overall response of the emergency services will be greater than the sum of their individual efforts, to the benefit of the public.
- 1.2 This Manual provides summaries of the responses and responsibilities of each of the emergency services at a major incident, as well as an outline of the support role offered by local authorities. We hope it will offer better understanding to the individual specialists involved in working with each other in a co-ordinated way. Its contents are the official policy of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and form the basis of that organisation's training strategy for major incidents. There are many serious and protracted incidents which do not meet the criteria for a major incident but which would nonetheless warrant a co-ordinated effort from the services involved. On these occasions there would be clear benefits from using the relevant aspects from this Manual and maintaining the continuity of the co-ordinated approach these procedures provide.
- 1.3 It has been prepared for the information and guidance of the emergency services and local authorities but may be used by any other responsible organisation which may have to respond to a major incident. It must be remembered that the procedures within this Manual are generally related to activities at, or ancillary to, the scene of the incident, that have a bearing on a number of the agencies involved. Detailed descriptions of single service functions are not included.
- 1.4 The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) recognises that every major incident is different and has its own unique features. The advice contained within this Manual should only be regarded as a guide. It is designed to offer a framework within which those who are responsible for the successful resolution of the incident are able to work together with maximum efficiency.
- 1.5 Experience has taught that there are many seemingly harmless sets of circumstances which can, if not dealt with speedily, escalate to the level of a major incident. Prevention is better than cure. No one will be criticised for treating an incident as serious in the first instance even if events later prove it not to be. The definitions and procedures contained in this Manual, dealing with major incidents, apply equally to arrangements which should be put in place to ensure the speedy resolution of seemingly minor incidents.
- 1.6 It should be noted that the procedures set out in this Manual would apply to major incidents initiated by terrorist acts.

Section 2

2. MAJOR INCIDENTS

2.1 Definition

2.1.1 A major incident is any emergency (including known or suspected acts of terrorism) that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or all of the emergency services and will generally include the involvement, either directly or indirectly, of large numbers of people. For example:

- the rescue and transportation of a large number of casualties;
- the large-scale combined resources of the police, London Fire Brigade (LFB) and London Ambulance Service (LAS);
- the mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and support services, for example local authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people;
- the handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media usually made to the police.

2.2 Declaration

2.2.1 A major incident may be declared by any officer of one of the emergency services who considers that any of the criteria outlined above has been satisfied.


2.2.2 Despite the fact that what is a major incident to one of the emergency services may not be so to another, each of the other emergency services will attend with an appropriate pre-determined response. This is so even if they are to be employed in a stand-by capacity and not directly involved in the incident.

2.3 Stages

2.3.1 Most major incidents can be considered to have four stages:

- the initial response;
- the consolidation phase;
- the recovery phase; and
- the restoration of normality.

2.3.2 An investigation into the cause of the incident, together with the attendant hearings, may be superimposed onto the whole structure.



Section 3

3. MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE EMERGENCY SERVICES

3.1 General

3.1.1 Rescue will most frequently be the prime function required of the emergency services. Responsibility for the rescue of survivors lies with the LFB. The care and transportation of casualties to hospital is the responsibility of the LAS. Police will ease these operations by co-ordinating the emergency services, local authorities and other agencies.

3.2 Police

3.2.1 The primary areas of police responsibility at a major incident are:

- the saving of life together with the other emergency services;
- the co-ordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations acting in support at the scene of the incident;
- to secure, protect and preserve the scene and to control sightseers and traffic through the use of cordons;
- the investigation of the incident and obtaining and securing of evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable;
- the collection and distribution of casualty information;
- the identification of the dead on behalf of Her Majesty's (HM) Coroner;
- the prevention of crime;
- short-term measures to restore normality after all necessary actions have been taken.

3.3 Fire brigade

3.3.1 The primary areas of the LFB responsibility at a major incident are:

- life-saving through search and rescue;
- fire fighting and fire prevention;
- rendering humanitarian services;
- management of hazardous materials and protecting the environment;
- salvage and damage control;
- safety management within the inner cordon.

3.4 Ambulance service

3.4.1 The primary areas of responsibility for the LAS at a major incident may be summarised as:

- to save life together with the other emergency services;
- to provide treatment, stabilisation and care of those injured at the scene;
- to provide appropriate transport, medical staff, equipment and resources;
- to establish effective triage points and systems and determine the priority evacuation needs of those injured;
- to provide a focal point at the incident for all National Health Service and other medical resources;

- to provide communication facilities for NHS resources at the scene, with direct radio links to hospitals, control facilities and any other agency as required;
- to nominate and alert the receiving hospitals from the official list of hospitals to receive those injured;
- to provide transport to the incident scene for the medical incident officer (MIO), mobile medical/surgical teams and their equipment;
- to arrange the most appropriate means of transporting those injured to the receiving and specialist hospitals;
- to maintain emergency cover throughout the LAS area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time.

Section 4

4. ACTIONS BY FIRST OFFICERS AT THE SCENE

4.1.1 IT IS IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT A MAJOR INCIDENT SHOULD BE FORMALLY DECLARED AS SOON AS THE CRITERIA (DEFINED IN SECTION 2.1.1) ARE SATISFIED.

4.2 Police

4.2.1 The primary duties of the first police officer on scene are to:

4.2.2 Assess the situation.

4.2.3 Ensure the following information is passed back to their control room. The mnemonic 'CHALET' has been devised to help:

Casualties – approximate numbers of dead, injured and uninjured.

Hazards – present and potential.

Access – best access routes for emergency vehicles.

Location – the exact location of the incident.

Emergency – emergency services present and required.

Type – type of incident with brief details of numbers of vehicles, buildings, etc, involved.

4.2.4 The officer should then:

- decide whether to declare a major incident;
- take interim charge until relieved by a more senior officer;
- maintain contact with their control room.

4.2.5 The officer must not get personally involved in rescue work.

4.3 Fire brigade

4.3.1 Since the initial call to an incident may not carry sufficient information to identify the call as a major incident, the incident commander of the first attendance will assess the situation and report. This message will include the phrase 'INITIATE MAJOR INCIDENT PROCEDURE'.

4.3.2 The incident commander of the first attendance will take all necessary measures to:

- assess the effectiveness of fire fighting or other measures carried out before his/her arrival;
- identify the risks associated with the location including those details held on the Brigade's Central Risks Register;
- form a plan of action to deal with the developing situation;
- decide on appropriate additional resources;
- take effective command and issue instructions to effect the plan of action;
- maintain operational command of the fire fighting and rescue operations within the inner cordon;

- evaluate the situation and any potential for development, preparing to brief a more senior officer on the incident, the police and ambulance service officers attending;
- liaise with other emergency service incident officers at the earliest opportunity and provide a safety briefing.

4.4 Ambulance

4.4.1 The first ambulance or paramedic response vehicle may arrive on scene before the ambulance incident officer (AIO). The following procedures should be adopted:

- report arrival on scene to central ambulance control (CAC);
- confirm incident appears to be ‘a major incident’;
- liaise with other emergency service incident officers;
- provide CAC with a detailed situation report, use ‘CHALET’ (para 4.2.3);
- request ambulance/medical resources required pending the arrival of the AIO.

4.4.2 The duty officer or first vehicle attendant should act as AIO until relieved by the nominated senior ambulance officer.

4.5 Medical incident officer (MIO)

4.5.1 This role is undertaken by a senior clinician with appropriate experience and training. The MIO is usually taken to the scene by an ambulance service vehicle, but is not part of the mobile medical team and should not get personally involved in rescue work.


4.5.2 The MIO has managerial responsibility for the deployment of medical and nursing staff at the scene and will liaise closely with the AIO to ensure effective management of resources.

4.5.3 **Mobilisation of MIOs is the sole responsibility of the ambulance service.** The LAS maintains a medical incident officer pool and will invariably deploy doctors from this group when the need for an MIO and support becomes apparent.

4.5.4 All receiving hospitals have plans for their individual response to major incidents. Each plan provides for the designation of an MIO. The LAS will mobilise MIOs from receiving hospitals if pool doctors are unavailable, eg in cases of multiple major incidents.

Section 5

5. SCENE MANAGEMENT



- 5.1 Cordons
- 5.1.1 Cordons are established around the scene for the following reasons:
- to guard the scene;
 - to protect the public;
 - to control the sightseers;
 - to prevent unauthorised interference with evidence or property;
 - to facilitate the operations of the emergency services.
- 5.1.2 There are recent cases which underline the importance of scene security for all agencies involved in the response. It should be noted that unauthorised access to the site of a major incident could jeopardise both the rescue and investigation. Any difficulties with identification should be referred immediately to the appropriate control vehicle at the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC).
- 5.1.3 Three cordons will be established. This will be done by the police in consultation with other agencies:
- Inner cordon – provides immediate security of the hazard area and potential crime scene.
- Outer cordon – seals off an extensive area around the inner cordon.
- Traffic cordon – set up at or beyond the outer cordon to prevent unauthorised vehicle access to the area surrounding the scene.
- 5.1.4 In terrorist or suspected terrorist incidents it is a criminal offence to contravene a prohibition or restriction imposed under Section 16(c) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. This includes the crossing of a police cordon.
- 5.1.5 For all known or suspected terrorist incidents all personnel should be aware of the possibility of secondary devices. Police will be responsible for checking rendezvous points (RVPs), marshalling areas, JESCC and cordon points for suspicious objects.
- 5.2 Inner cordon
- 5.2.1 The fire brigade is responsible for safety management of all personnel within the inner cordon. At terrorist incidents the Anti-Terrorist Branch Scene Manager must also be consulted on safety issues.
- 5.2.2 When cordons are set, persons who do not have a role or who are wearing inappropriate clothing will be directed to leave the cordon.
- 5.2.3 To aid with identification of personnel authorised, suitably clothed and briefed to be in the inner cordon, the fire brigade inner cordon controller and inner cordon controllers will issue armbands and record all personnel already in or entering the inner cordon.
- 5.2.4 The police and LAS, working in conjunction with the LFB, will also log and verify their own service personnel entering the inner cordon. In addition, the police will log representatives from the utilities and other investigators.
- 5.2.5 The fire brigade has an emergency evacuation signal which all personnel, working in the inner cordon, must be aware of and respond to if the area becomes hazardous. The fire brigade officer will blow several short, sharp blasts on a whistle and declare a safe point to withdraw to. People entering the inner cordon must be made aware of this signal.
- 5.2.6 Non-emergency service personnel providing assistance in the inner cordon will be directed to the appropriate command vehicle prior to going to the inner cordon.

- 5.3 Outer cordon
 - 5.3.1 Police will control all access and exit points to the outer cordon. Non-emergency service personnel requiring access through the outer cordon will be vetted at the Scene Access Control (see below) prior to attending the access point. It does not give access to the inner cordon.
 - 5.3.2 The command/control vehicles of the emergency services must be positioned between the inner and outer cordons as will the rendezvous point and marshalling area (see below).
- 5.4 Traffic cordon
 - 5.4.1 The traffic cordon is established to restrict vehicle access to the area surrounding the scene.
 - 5.4.2 Immediate action must be taken to ensure the free passage of emergency traffic to and from the scene of the incident and to prevent congestion at and around the scene.
 - 5.4.3 All emergency, specialist and voluntary services attending the scene will be directed as follows: emergency services to the RVP initially, specialist and voluntary services to the scene access control centre for vetting prior to direction to the RVP.
- 5.5 Rendezvous point
 - 5.5.1 This will be established within the outer cordon and will be under the control of a police officer wearing the appropriate reflective tabard.
 - 5.5.2 All emergency, specialist and voluntary services will be directed here in the first instance.
 - 5.5.3 The police officer will advise the appropriate service command vehicle of the resources arriving. Any not immediately required will be directed to the marshalling area.
 - 5.5.4 It must be noted that the RVP plaque displayed at London Underground stations is for the use of London Underground and London Fire Brigade staff only. It is not an RVP for the purposes set out above.
- 5.6 Marshalling area
 - 5.6.1 A marshalling area, under the control of an officer from each service, wearing appropriate reflective tabards, should be established between the RVP and the scene. The actual location will be agreed after consultation between the police and fire 'silvers'.
 - 5.6.2 This area is for resources not immediately required at the scene, or which, having served their purpose, are being held for future use. It should, therefore, be an area suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles.
 - 5.6.3 Marshalling areas may also be used to provide briefing/debriefing areas and recuperation for personnel involved in arduous work at the scene.
 - 5.6.4 As the event is scaled down the utilities and other contractors will need to maintain the marshalling area for the duration of the recovery phase.
- 5.7 Joint Emergency Services Control Centre
 - 5.7.1 The LFB, police and LAS control/command vehicles will form the focus from which the major incident will be managed. These vehicles, together with those of the public utilities and local authority, will be located close to one another and be known collectively as the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC). The incident officers (silvers) will jointly exercise their authority from this point in a co-ordinated manner.
 - 5.7.2 The importance of this joint control function should not be underestimated. The experience of other disasters has demonstrated the benefits derived by the establishment of close contact between the emergency services and other agencies involved in the management of the incident.

5.7.3 **Siting of vehicles**

5.7.4 The officer in charge of the first command/control vehicle on the scene should make allowance for the siting of other emergency service command vehicles.

5.7.5 The site should:

- have enough space to accommodate all anticipated agency controls;
- be away from the hazards of the scene, but close enough to maintain control over it;
- be chosen carefully as relocation may prove extremely difficult.

5.7.6 Ideally the site would be served with good access, lighting and toilets and have telephone facilities close by. Realistically this will be unusual in operational terms. A wide thoroughfare or surface car park may be used as the JESCC in the absence of more suitable accommodation.

5.7.7 The advice of the LFB on matters of fire safety will be sought by the other emergency services in connection with the placement of the JESCC. This advice may well be changed if the incident subsequently proves to involve chemicals or other hazardous materials. The choice of site would then be influenced by wind direction, strength and gradients. In this event, the Brigade's scientific adviser (and if available on site, safety personnel), will advise on the most suitable location for the JESCC. The Brigade's geographic information system is available on command vehicles and may also be used to determine a suitable site.

5.7.8 The police silver will, having consulted with the other emergency services, be responsible for confirming or amending the siting of the command/control vehicles and will establish liaison between them.

5.7.9 The LFB will usually set up the inter-agency (Matel) link between the command/control vehicles. Although vehicles should be positioned close enough to ensure efficient liaison and co-ordination, their proximity must not impair good radio communications. About 10 metres separation is ideal.

5.7.10 If a service mobilises more than one control/command vehicle to the scene, only one of these will perform the control function at the JESCC.

5.7.11 To aid identification, the blue, red or green identifying lights on each of the main control vehicles of the emergency services will be switched on. The identifying lights on all other vehicles must be switched off, except during incidents on open motorways or elsewhere where they are necessary to avoid accidents.

5.8 **Scene access control**

5.8.1 A scene access control centre must be established outside the outer cordon, if possible in an area adjacent to the RVP. The centre, which will be under police command, must be clearly identifiable to those wishing to gain entry through the outer cordon. If necessary an approach route must be established and signposted.

5.8.2 The Scene Access Control (SAC) will be responsible for checking the authenticity of and issuing passes to non-emergency service personnel whose presence is required within the outer cordon and beyond. Such persons should be directed to the SAC in the first instance by the authority requesting their attendance.

5.8.3 The SAC must maintain a record of all persons who have been directed to them in order to gain access and will need to establish a link with the JESCC for this purpose at an early stage. If possible the SAC will establish communication links with the JESCC by way of telephone, radio and fax.

5.8.4 Once satisfied as to their credentials the SAC staff will issue the appropriate pass and escort them to the RVP.

5.8.5 It must be emphasised that the role of the SAC is to facilitate entry through the outer cordon by non-emergency service personnel, whose presence is required. It does not replace the arrangements in place in relation to control of and entry to the inner cordon.

Section 6

6. COMMAND AND CONTROL

6.1 Initial control

6.1.1 It is possible that early on in the incident members of one service will spontaneously carry out tasks normally the responsibility of another. As soon as sufficient staff arrive each service can be expected to establish unequivocal command and control of functions for which it is normally responsible.

6.2 Gold, silver and bronze

6.2.1 'Gold', 'silver' and 'bronze' are titles of functions adopted by each of the emergency services and are role related not rank related. These functions are equivalent to those described as 'strategic', 'tactical' and 'operational' in other documents about emergency procedures. In summary the roles of each can be described as:

6.3 Gold (strategic)

6.3.1 Gold is the commander in overall charge of each service, responsible for formulating the strategy for the incident. Each gold has overall command of the resources of their own organisation, but delegates tactical decisions to their respective silver(s).

6.3.2 At the outset of the incident gold will determine the strategy and record a strategy statement. This will need to be monitored and subject to ongoing review.

6.4 Silver (tactical)

6.4.1 Silver will attend the scene, take charge and be responsible for formulating the tactics to be adopted by their service to achieve the strategy set by gold. Silver should not become personally involved with activities close to the incident, but remain detached.

6.5 Bronze (operational)

6.5.1 Bronze will control and deploy the resources of their respective service within a geographical sector or specific role and implement the tactics defined by silver.

6.5.2 It should be understood that the titles do not convey seniority of service or rank, but depict the function carried out by that particular person. From the outset it is important that the senior officers of each service on scene liaise with each other. This will be the foundation upon which all later meetings will be based.

6.5.3 As the incident progresses and more resources attend the RVP, the level of supervision will increase in proportion. As senior managers arrive they will be assigned functions within the gold, silver and bronze structure.

6.5.4 Senior officers arriving at their respective command/control vehicles are to establish contact with their incident commanders and should also make contact with the police silver in order to notify any transfer of command.

6.5.5 It is important that the title holder wears a uniquely identifiable tabard and passes it on to their successor.

6.5.6 By using this universal structure the emergency services will be able to communicate with each other and understand each other's functions and authority.

6.6 Inter-agency resources

6.6.1 Any service may request the temporary assistance of personnel and equipment of another. In these circumstances while the supporting service will relinquish the immediate control of those resources to the other service for the duration of the task, it will nevertheless keep overall command of its personnel and equipment at all times.

6.6.2 Personnel from one service who help another in this way should only be given tasks for which they are trained and not simply supplement the other service in a potentially dangerous situation. For instance, police officers may be directed to implement cordons or become stretcher-bearers to release fire fighters for rescue work. They should not undertake hazardous rescue work themselves.

Section 7

7. GOLD AND SILVER CO-ORDINATING GROUPS

7.1 General

- 7.1.1 The formation of both a gold and silver co-ordinating group has been of great value at all recent major incidents. The supervising officers of each of the services will initially be fully occupied with their own sphere of activity and there will, inevitably, be some delay in a co-ordinating group being set up, but this should be kept to a minimum.
- 7.1.2 It is important to emphasise that:
- it is essential that the first supervising officers on scene from each of the emergency services liaise closely with each other at the earliest opportunity.
- 7.1.3 These officers may be invited to the first silver co-ordinating group meeting to describe their initial decisions or they will brief their representative on the group before the meeting.
- 7.1.4 It is important, when agencies send a representative to either a gold or silver co-ordinating group meeting, that the person has sufficient authority to guarantee that the facilities they offer on behalf of their service will be delivered.
- 7.1.5 On the other hand, it is useful if only one person from each service attends so that the meetings are not unduly long.
- 7.1.6 Minutes, or a note of decisions taken, must be kept of all meetings of the co-ordinating groups. It is also essential that individual members of the group make their own notes of meetings.
- 7.1.7 Minutes, or a note of decisions taken and personal notes, should provide an *aide-mémoire* of the continuing overall progress of the operation. They will provide a perspective against which decisions or priorities can be made.
- 7.1.8 A major incident will necessarily involve an investigation as to its cause and quite possibly a formal inquest, inquiry or criminal trial. The actions of the senior officers of the emergency services will be of considerable interest. Therefore notes will be invaluable and will, insofar as they are relevant, be disclosable, that is, made available in subsequent proceedings.

7.2 Gold co-ordinating group

7.2.1 **Representatives**

7.2.2 This group will consist of the following:

7.2.3 Police (who will chair the meeting)

- overall incident commander (police gold)
- minute taker

7.2.4 Fire

- overall incident commander (fire gold)

7.2.5 Ambulance

- overall incident commander (medic gold)

7.2.6 Local authority

- it will invariably be desirable for the chief executive of the local authority providing support services to attend the gold co-ordinating group meetings.

- 7.2.7 Other
- additional representation will depend upon the scale of the incident. It may be necessary to have an inner core of permanent members and an outer group of advisors, specialists and others who could be called upon to attend as necessary.
- 7.2.8 **Location of meetings**
- 7.2.9 The gold group will normally meet at a location completely detached from the scene with suitable communications and meeting facilities.
- 7.2.10 **Frequency of meetings**
- 7.2.11 In general the nature and difficulties of the incident will govern the frequency of gold meetings.
- 7.2.12 **Tasks**
- 7.2.13 The agenda for the gold co-ordinating group meetings will be decided by the group at the time and will depend upon the type and scale of the incident.
- 7.2.14 At the outset the gold group will determine the strategic issues relevant to the incident.
- 7.2.15 In addition the group may provide liaison with central government and other bodies, ensure that sufficient support and resources are available at the incident and maintain a strategic overview.
- 7.2.16 Coupled with this will be visits made by VIPs to the scene and to injured survivors. These visits place additional strain on the operation in terms of security, public order, increased media attention and interruption to normal rescue functions. Police gold will undertake the planning and liaison role for these visits.
- 7.3 Silver co-ordinating group
- 7.3.1 **Representatives**
- 7.3.2 This group will consist of the following:
- 7.3.3 Police (who will chair the meeting)
- incident officer (police silver)
 - senior investigating officer, where applicable (SIO)
 - minute taker
- 7.3.4 Fire
- incident officer (fire silver)
 - scientific adviser, where applicable
- 7.3.5 Ambulance
- incident officer (medic silver)
 - medical incident officer (MIO)
- 7.3.6 Local authority
- it will invariably be desirable for a senior representative of the local authority providing support services to attend this meeting.

7.3.7 **Location of meeting**

7.3.8 For convenience the silver co-ordinating group should initially meet close to the scene; it may be moved to premises which are better served, although further from the scene, as operations progress.

7.3.9 **Frequency of meetings**

7.3.10 The police incident officer will call an initial meeting of the silver co-ordinating group at the earliest reasonable opportunity. Subsequent meetings of this group can be arranged at this first meeting or may be called by the police incident officer at the request of another member of the group.

7.3.11 **Tasks**

7.3.12 The agenda should, as far as practicable, be restricted to items that concern three or more of the relevant services, as those matters concerning only two services can usually be resolved by direct two-way liaison.

7.3.13 Some items, such as safety, situation reports, priorities and future developments, will always be necessary.

7.3.14 **Safety**

7.3.15 At incidents concerned with fire, the danger of fire, or involving rescue, the LFB will give the silver group professional advice on matters of safety.

7.3.16 **Situation reports**

7.3.17 Each service should briefly describe the situation as it affects its own operations and, if necessary, mention those matters for which it requires the assistance or co-operation of others.

7.3.18 **Priorities**

7.3.19 Priorities are essential to create a cohesive joint strategy. This will indicate how the resources available can be deployed in the most effective and efficient manner.

7.3.20 Each service will have objectives to meet within its own area of responsibility. It is important to establish which of these should have priority at the particular stage the incident has reached. In that way, inter-service difficulties may be avoided and each may concentrate upon those actions which contribute most to the success of the operation.

7.3.21 **Future developments**

7.3.22 This group should give consideration to the requirements of later phases of the operation, including the identification of actions that need to be taken in advance.

Section 8

8. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

8.1 General

8.1.1 Within the Capital, each of the emergency services and separate police forces have entirely independent radio communications systems. That is not to say that they are totally incompatible but certain procedures need to be adopted to achieve mutual communication. It is useful to be aware of the various types of communications employed by each constituent member.

8.2 Warning

8.2.1 No communications system is secure from eavesdroppers. Radio scanners capable of receiving police, fire, ambulance and local authority radio transmissions are readily available. Similarly, fax scanners can be quickly brought to the scene to intercept information transmitted between the services and agencies. This should be borne in mind when wording any transmission, including cellular telephone conversations, which may contain sensitive information.

8.3 Terrorism

8.3.1 At known or suspected terrorist incidents radios should be kept on. The obvious benefits in being able to communicate at a major incident far outweigh the remote risk of activating a device through radio transmission. Only when an unexploded suspect device has been located should personnel withdraw to at least 10 metres from the device before transmitting on personal radios. This distance should be increased to 50 metres when vehicle based radios are used. It should be borne in mind that GSM digital telephones and some trunk radio systems permanently transmit as part of their normal operating procedure. When a device is discovered these items should be disconnected and not activated until they are outside the 50 metre zone mentioned above.

8.4 City of London Police (COLP)

8.4.1 The COLP has a major incident vehicle equipped with:

- COLP multi-channel UHF set;
- MPS multi-channel UHF set;
- public address system;
- Vodafores;
- loudhailers.

8.4.2 Within the City, a short-wave radio facility exists, supplied by the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY), for use at Casualty Bureau, hospitals and rest centres.

8.4.3 The COLP force control room has all the computer hardware common to many computer-aided despatch systems found in all service headquarters. This is assisted by the monitoring of events on strategically placed cameras within central London relayed to screens within the control room.

8.5 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

8.5.1 The MPS has an almost identical system of computer-aided despatch, together with camera coverage of almost the entire inner London traffic network. The region's police helicopter can provide a video of an incident anywhere in London which can be received at the Central Communications Complex (Information Room) at New Scotland Yard and can also be received at certain 'remote' sites when applicable.

- 8.5.2 There is a centrally-based mobile communications vehicle (MCV) staffed by Information Room officers which is fitted with radios and cellphones and which can be speedily deployed to a scene.
- 8.5.3 There are also major incident (silver control) vehicles each situated at strategic locations around London. They are equipped similarly to the COLP vehicle and can accommodate a small briefing group. Area officers will staff them. In addition, there are bronze command vehicles throughout London.
- 8.5.4 In the MPS the 'main' radio network is fitted to vehicles. The personal radios issued to officers patrolling on foot are only in contact with their local police station. The personal radios issued to MPS personnel do not function underground. New Scotland Yard communicates with local police stations by Computer Aided Despatch (CAD), main force radio and fax.
- 8.5.5 In emergencies there is a small reserve of Vodafones available at New Scotland Yard for despatch to the scene.
- 8.6 British Transport Police (BTP)
- 8.6.1 The BTP have three radio systems in London.
- 8.6.2 On the surface there are both VHF high band and UHF personal radio systems covering a large part of London. The UHF radios carry the Home Office channel plan including the inter-agency command Channels 69 and 70.
- 8.6.3 At sub-surface LUL stations a second VHF channel is used. The underground system displays both the personal radio call sign and location to the controller.
- 8.6.4 BTP can also mobilise an incident control vehicle with the normal communications facilities and equipment, including Cellnet digital phones, H. Dept. National radio, Airshelter, generators and other such equipment.
- 8.7 London Fire Brigade (LFB)
- 8.7.1 The command and mobilising system for the LFB is situated at its Lambeth Headquarters and is able to despatch fire service vehicles by using its computer mobilising system, VHF radios, paging and telephone systems as appropriate.
- 8.7.2 All LFB front-line appliances are equipped with VHF radios and have the ability to communicate with the control from anywhere in the Greater London area. The London Fire Brigade has hand-held UHF personal radios available on all its front-line appliances together with an additional supply on command vehicles for command purposes. These radios will be compatible with 'leaky feeder' systems currently being installed in LUL sub-surface railway stations and certain other underground locations.
- 8.7.3 As well as main VHF radio, LFB command vehicles also carry the following communication facilities:
- 'Matel' field telephones are compatible with the other emergency service control vehicles. These are available for use at major incidents for liaison purposes and establishing communications with control vehicles;
 - a mobile leaky feed cable capable of being laid into areas of bad VHF reception;
 - cellular telephones which are available for alternative communication purposes;
 - cellular faxes;
 - downlink image receivers (helicopter).

- 8.7.4 All command vehicles are equipped with computers and are staffed by personnel trained in the use of the Command Planning System (CPS) software. The CPS is an interactive software package based on OS maps that is designed to assist incident management.
- 8.7.5 All major incidents and incidents of note are monitored in the Brigade Command Support Centre (CSC), which also deals with liaison and other issues specific to major incidents. CSC personnel are able to view the CPS and input information to support incident commanders on the command vehicles, whilst also able to overview the CPS incident management.
- 8.8 London Ambulance Service (LAS)
- 8.8.1 LAS vehicles also have a variety of communications. The motorcycles and emergency ambulances are fitted with VHF radios channelled into Central Ambulance Control at the Ambulance Service Headquarters at Waterloo. The new generation communications feature some automatic functions.
- 8.8.2 The duty officers use command and control vehicles (CCVs) which have a choice of equipment:
- service VHF radios;
 - hand-held UHF radios for use at the scene;
 - cellular telephones.
- 8.8.3 The two large emergency control vehicles (ECVs) may also form an integral part of the JESCC using the Matel telephone link between control vehicles.
- 8.9 MPS Special Operations Room (MP SOR)
- 8.9.1 The Special Operations Room at New Scotland Yard (call sign 'GT') has monitored all major disasters that have occurred in London within recent years. It is part of the Central Command Complex and is similar to the Information Room.
- 8.9.2 Its sole function is to monitor disasters, terrorist incidents, disorder and demonstrations. The room has consoles that are set aside for the LAS, LFB, BTP, COLP and additional agencies (for example armed forces). It is from here that the various service liaison officers work. They have access to all the radio and CAD communications channelled through the room and can, for example, relay requests for assistance to their own control rooms.
- 8.9.3 SOR does not control the incident. Its function is to provide a support structure to gold and those at the scene, to assist in the management of the incident. It cannot be over-emphasised that the best operational communications will always be conducted verbally between service representatives on-site.
- 8.9.4 Within Central Command Complex at New Scotland Yard there are also facilities for communicating with all other police forces in the United Kingdom, members of Interpol and central government.
- 8.10 Inter-agency command channel
- 8.10.1 The MPS and the LFB command vehicles that attend the scene are each equipped with a number of hand-held multi-channel UHF radios. These will operate on the inter-agency command channel using Channels 69 and 70 (National Channel Plan). These radios are intended for command use only by the respective service silvers for liaison purposes and not for general inter-service use. Police are responsible for issuing the radios to the other services at the scene.

- 8.11 Liaison officers
- 8.11.1 An LFB officer will attend the MPS Special Operations Room at NSY, the COLP Communications Centre at Wood Street, or the BTP HQ at Tavistock Place, depending which force is carrying out the police functions at the incident.
- 8.11.2 The LAS will provide liaison officers to police and LFB HQ on request.
- 8.11.3 Liaison officers from other organisations may be appointed as required.
- 8.11.4 Great care must be taken to avoid duplication of liaison officers and the confusion it can cause, particularly at the scene.
- 8.12 Local authority communications
- 8.12.1 Many local authorities are provided with their own integral radio communications systems. However, these may not be compatible between boroughs or with the emergency services.
- 8.13 British Telecommunications assistance
- 8.13.1 British Telecommunications (BT) is able to offer the emergency services certain specialist communication equipment for use in a major incident. This includes:
- radiopagers;
 - cellphones;
 - between two and six additional pre-wired lines at most exchanges in London;
 - payphone trailers for use by the press or at a survivor reception centre;
 - equipment such as fax machines, telexes, small switchboards and so on.
- 8.13.2 This and other equipment may be mobilised by contacting the 24-hour BT duty manager.
- 8.13.3 BT wish to remind potential users of this facility that they reserve the right to make a charge if implemented.
- 8.14 Access Overload Control (ACCOLC)
- 8.14.1 The ACCOLC system is a government-authorized scheme whereby the major portable telephone companies Cellnet and Vodafone can reserve exclusive use of available channels for the emergency services and local authorities at the scene of a major incident. It allows for calls to be made without being interrupted by overloaded radio telephone networks.
- 8.14.2 This facility is expensive to implement and can cause inconvenience to normal subscribers. Therefore it should only be initiated after careful consideration and on the authority of police silver who has raised the matter with the co-ordinating group. Calls should be as brief as possible.
- 8.15 Radio Amateur s Emergency Network (RAYNET)
- 8.15.1 RAYNET is a nationwide voluntary group of United Kingdom government-licensed radio operators who are able to provide emergency radio communications to the emergency services, local authorities and central government departments. Their radio communications equipment is specifically designated for use in emergencies.
- 8.15.2 Greater London RAYNET can provide specialist VHF/UHF radio communications assistance across London and beyond into neighbouring counties. National and international radio communications can also be provided if requested.
- 8.15.3 The assistance of RAYNET should be sought from the appropriate service control.
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Section 9

9. CASUALTY CLEARANCE

9.1 Categories

9.1.1 A primary responsibility of the emergency services at a major incident is the recovery and documentation of casualties. Casualties fall into one of four categories:

- uninjured;
- injured;
- dead;
- evacuees.

9.1.2 The above may be witnesses/victims or even suspects and carry evidence or hazards on their clothing, particularly in terrorist incidents.

9.2 Uninjured

9.2.1 These people will have been involved in the incident, but will not necessarily want or require medical attention. They too must be removed from the hazard by the LFB. The LAS will have little involvement with these casualties other than perhaps to render first aid.

9.2.2 They will all be witnesses however and the police service will need to collate their details for the benefit of the Casualty Bureau as well as the senior investigating officer (SIO). This can be done at suitable premises nearby, called the survivor reception centre.

9.3 Injured

9.3.1 These people need to be rescued from the scene as quickly and safely as possible by the fire brigade, who must be mindful of the requirement of the ambulance and medical teams on site. Ambulance paramedics and technicians then need to be able to administer the appropriate pre-hospital treatment before the patients are taken to the receiving hospitals.

9.3.2 To work an effective triage system on scene and to minimise delay in evacuation by lengthy documentation, it is essential that all casualties are prioritised and labelled in accordance with the nationally accepted casualty triage label. Ambulance/medical personnel will carry this out.

9.3.3 The standard labelling of patients covers four categories:

- (a) immediate first priority – Orange
- (b) urgent second priority – Yellow
- (c) delayed third priority – Green
- (d) deceased – White

(LAS personnel will use the national body labelling system upon request of police.)

9.3.4 It is particularly important that those patients who have received pain-relieving drugs can be readily identified on arrival at the receiving hospital.

9.3.5 Police should liaise with the ambulance service to maintain a count of all persons processed with details of hospitals to which they have been taken.

9.3.6 Police officers will be deployed to the casualty departments of these hospitals to perform the role of hospital security and documentation teams.

- 9.4 Dead
- 9.4.1 The dead should not be moved unless it is the only way of reaching a live casualty, or if the dead body is likely to be lost or further damaged. Otherwise dead bodies must be left in place until the evidence gathering stage begins.
- 9.4.2 It should be borne in mind that the Coroner, pathologist or any other investigating agency may wish to view bodies in situ and they must therefore be consulted before recovery of the deceased begins.
- 9.4.3 The dead will be marked using the nationally agreed police labelling system. The fire brigade will, on request, assist police with body recovery. If it is necessary for bodies to be labelled by the fire brigade on behalf of the police, then the national identification label appropriate to the lead police force will be used.
- 9.4.4 Once recovered, bodies will be removed in the first instance to a body collecting point where they will be collated before transfer to the mortuary. At the mortuary, teams of police officers work with the pathologist and other specialists to establish the identity of the deceased and cause of death, and to provide security.
- 9.4.5 It is important that the dead be moved from the scene to a body holding area as soon as practicable to avoid undue delay to the identification and notification of the next of kin.
- 9.4.6 All the emergency services have a legal obligation to HM Coroner to provide evidential continuity of the handling of a dead body from its location at the incident through its recovery to the post mortem examination.
- 9.4.7 If only one officer has handled the body then continuity is simple to establish. If several officers, perhaps from different services, have handled the body then they must provide statements and continuity evidence about that body.
- 9.4.8 The MPS has trained specialist body recovery and identification teams.
- 9.5 Evacuees
- 9.5.1 Some emergencies may require the evacuation of a large surrounding area because of the danger to life from environmental or structural hazards.
- 9.5.2 Evacuation is primarily a police role and is usually undertaken on the advice of the fire brigade silver. In some circumstances, personnel from all services may have to assist in carrying it out.
- 9.5.3 A suitable evacuation assembly point will need to be established and rest centres set up by the local authority.
- 9.5.4 Personnel from the local authority and from voluntary agencies will staff rest centres. The centres will provide security, welfare, communication, catering and medical facilities.
- 9.5.5 Evacuees should be documented and details passed to the Casualty Bureau.
- 9.6 Survivor reception centre
- 9.6.1 Here the voluntary aid societies can supply comfort and counselling, telephone calls can be made, and investigations can begin to interview witnesses and determine whether it is necessary to document every single survivor.
- 9.6.2 The centre needs to provide shelter, first aid treatment, welfare support, communications and room for documentation. Police will provide a security and documentation team for this purpose.
- 9.6.3 Details of survivors should be passed to the Casualty Bureau.

- 9.7 Friends and relatives reception centre
- 9.7.1 Where demand warrants it police should give consideration to establishing a secure area where friends and relatives of casualties can be directed for information.
- 9.8 Casualty Bureau
- 9.8.1 Police will establish a Casualty Bureau where details on all dead, casualties, survivors and evacuees will be collated.
- 9.8.2 At the same time they will take enquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident.
- 9.8.3 Casualty Bureau staff will then match details of persons involved with enquiries.
- 9.8.4 Where a match is made they will contact the enquirer and inform them of the condition and whereabouts of the person concerned. If the information is of a delicate nature it will be delivered by a personal visit from a police officer.
- 9.8.5 The Casualty Bureau does not close until all the casualties have been identified, all next of kin have been informed and telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police division.
- 9.8.6 Casualty figures must only be released by the police following consultation with the police gold or their press officer. no other service may give out these figures unless it has been cleared by the police gold.

Section 10

10. HELICOPTERS

10.1 Police helicopters

10.1.1 The MPS, COLP and Surrey Police (operating jointly as the South East Region Police Air Support Unit) operate helicopters over the whole of the Greater London area and beyond.

10.1.2 Their aircraft have the following equipment:

- comprehensive radio communications, including Air Traffic Control (ATC) waveband to ease communications with other emergency response aircraft;
- visual and thermal imaging equipment, effective day and night;
- a searchlight ('nitesun') capable of illuminating a wide area and for immediate rescue needs, operating at 800 feet for minimal ground disturbance;
- a public address system ('skyshout') capable of broadcasting messages at a lower operating height;
- video transmission equipment to ground based receiving stations which include both MPS and LFB command vehicles.

10.1.3 Helicopters can provide the following support facilities:

- immediate overview of scene, including the size of affected area, ancillary factors and so on;
- casualty search/assessment of numbers;
- identification of present or potential hazards;
- weather conditions, including wind direction at scene;
- area containment, including cordon deployment/infringement;
- traffic management/route planning schemes.

10.2 Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS)

10.2.1 Where an incident occurs which involves a very high number of casualties it may be necessary for some of them to be taken to a hospital some distance from the scene. In such cases the ambulance control will liaise with the Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) and, in certain circumstances, the military.

10.2.2 HEMS may also be mobilised to any casualty requiring advanced trauma life support from the on-board doctor and paramedic(s).

10.2.3 **Considerations**

10.2.4 In consultation with the senior police officer present the following must be considered:

- (a) the paramount type of injury;
- (b) the type of aircraft available;
- (c) the location and type of incident;
- (d) visibility and weather conditions;
- (e) flying time to the incident;
- (f) hazards present and potential;

- (g) availability of suitable landing sites adjacent to the ambulance loading point and the receiving hospital;
- (h) staff resources at the receiving hospital to help with the transfer of patients.

10.3 Temporary heli-pads

10.3.1 Temporary heli-pads might need to be identified with consideration for:

- (a) safety of crew and aircraft from obstructions such as wires, unit masts and unsuitable terrain;
- (b) safety from harmful chemical release, fire/smoke;
- (c) access to vehicle;
- (d) disturbance of debris/evidence or disruption by excessive noise.

10.4 Emergency landing procedures

10.4.1 To help incoming helicopters, an officer from any of the emergency services who has radio contact with the incoming aircraft should be appointed to provide a focal point for the aircraft at the intended landing site, acting as directed by the aircraft commander.

10.4.2 The officer, if requested, should:

- (a) direct the helicopter in for landing by standing with their back to the wind and stretching out arms to indicate the landing area;
- (b) approach or leave the helicopter in pilot's field of frontal vision;
- (c) at night, indicate the landing zone by converging the headlights of two vehicles over the area and placing the vehicles downwind to facilitate the helicopter landing into the wind.

10.5 Emergency flying restrictions

10.5.1 Police have the facility, through the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), to request the imposition of temporary emergency flying restrictions over the scene of an incident under certain circumstances. The most likely reason would be the safety of those in the air or on the ground. Requests for temporary emergency flying restrictions should be made through the police incident officer (PIO), who will review the necessity for such restrictions at regular intervals.

Section 11

11. INVESTIGATION

11.1 Evidence

- 11.1.1 Every major incident will be the subject of an investigation, whether for HM Coroner, a public inquiry, or civil or criminal court proceedings. As a result the evidence collected should be of the best possible quality.
- 11.1.2 Such evidence can only be gathered if the scene is secured as soon as possible and anything which can be reasonably anticipated to be required as evidence is preserved and not damaged, moved or disposed of without reference to the SIO.
- 11.1.3 Depending upon the nature of the incident several different agencies may carry out their own investigation. These agencies would include, for example:
- the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB);
 - the Marine Accident Investigation Branch;
 - the Health and Safety Executive, including HM Inspectorate of Railways.
- 11.1.4 Each agency may have different criteria as to what is admissible evidence. The police will need to obtain evidence of the highest standard for court and will require that all evidence is left in situ, unless the threat to life prevents this.
- 11.1.5 Aerial photography, both video and stills, can help throughout the incident in recording the scene for evidential purposes, as will any other photographic evidence available.
- 11.1.6 Accurate notes of what transpires at the scene also need to be made.
- ### 11.2 Police responsibilities
- 11.2.1 In all suspected terrorist-related incidents the MPS Anti-Terrorist Branch will lead the investigation and advise on safety.
- 11.2.2 In railway incidents, other than those involving terrorism or murder, the British Transport Police will be responsible for investigating the incident. Where the incident is of such a scale or there are special reasons, a joint team of BTP and local police should be formed, following discussions between senior officers of both forces.

Section 12

12. SAFETY

- 12.1 Emergency evacuation signal
 - 12.1.1 At the outset, all three emergency services may be employed within the inner cordon. LFB has an emergency evacuation signal which all personnel must be aware of and respond to if the area becomes hazardous. The LFB safety officer will blow several short sharp blasts on an Acme Thunderer Whistle and declare a safe point to withdraw to. The inner cordon controller must make personnel entering the cordon aware of this signal.
- 12.2 Factories and other industrial sites
 - 12.2.1 These locations have a range of potential hazards including substances that are flammable, reactive, explosive or toxic. Sometimes the hazards are multiple (for example, flammable and toxic) and may involve corrosive or radioactive materials.
 - 12.2.2 Protective clothing and breathing apparatus may be necessary for personal safety. Some hazards are not detectable by human senses. For some sites there are specific emergency plans made under the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) Regulations 1984 and the impending Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999.
 - 12.2.3 Enforcing authorities, including the Health and Safety Executive, will need access to such locations following major accidents and may need to gather evidence.
- 12.3 Fire brigade HAZMAT officers
 - 12.3.1 Certain fire officers who have completed the Hazardous Materials Course at the Fire Service College will be nominated as hazardous materials 'HAZMAT' officers.
 - 12.3.2 'HAZMAT' officers are now mobilised to all confirmed chemical incidents. They will liaise with the LFB scientific adviser. At radiation incidents these officers will carry out the role of radiation protection supervisors in accordance with Ionising Radiation Regulations 1985.
- 12.4 Rail incidents power off trains stopped
 - 12.4.1 The safety of personnel is paramount when working on or near the track.
 - 12.4.2 It is obviously dangerous to go into the vicinity of electrified railway lines or overhead power cables. Apart from the danger of electrocution, it must be realised that merely having the power switched off may not have the effect of stopping trains. Diesel powered trains, for example, are not dependent on the electric power and sometimes run on the same track.
 - 12.4.3 The request for 'power off – trains stopped' should be passed through the appropriate service control or locally through railway managers. The relevant rail operator will make confirmation that this request has been carried out to the service control.
 - 12.4.4 At the earliest opportunity, LFB lookouts will be posted along the lines some distance from the incident to give an audible warning of approaching traffic. They may also attempt to warn the driver by standing clear and raising both arms upright above their head. Helicopter support might also be considered for this purpose.
 - 12.4.5 Personnel must always wear high visibility clothing when working on or near the track. The number of such personnel working at the scene should be kept to a minimum.
 - 12.4.6 Railtrack as the lead authority for the rail industry will supply lookouts to protect the scene and an RIO (rail incident officer) as the liaison point between the emergency services.

Section 13

13. LOCAL AUTHORITY ASSISTANCE

13.1 Response

13.1.1 The main functions of a local authority during a major incident are to maintain existing services to the community in addition to providing requested support to the emergency services. Each of the 32 London boroughs and the Corporation of London employ a person who performs the function of emergency planning officer and is responsible for preparing the local authority response to civil emergencies.

13.1.2 Following the declaration of a major incident, the local authority acts in support of the emergency services. Its response will be flexible and in proportion to those resources available to it at the time.

13.2 Notification

13.2.1 Local authorities take time to mobilise and therefore early notification is required. They need to be updated constantly as the incident progresses so that their response is measured and appropriate. Good liaison between the emergency services and the local authority, particularly at the scene, is essential and will be enhanced by the presence of the local authority's control vehicle (or other facility) at the JESCC.

13.3 Involvement

13.3.1 The local authorities are able to supply considerable assistance to deal with particular problems such as:

- the provision of technical advice and resources;
- environmental health management;
- logistical support through local authority or contract resources;
- long-term management for the restoration of normality.

13.3.2 It is in the later stages of a major incident (the recovery period and return to normality) that the local authority's involvement may be prolonged and extensive. It may include:

- rehabilitation of the community;
- social services;
- counselling;
- emergency finance;
- emergency housing;
- the provision of equipment, transport and staff;
- the provision of suitable premises for some of the functions described elsewhere in this Manual, particularly in relation to casualties.

13.4 Mutual aid

13.4.1 Local authorities are arranged into groups and each authority is able to call on the assistance of others within its group.

13.4.2 There are five such groups in London each led by a 'lead borough':

Group	Lead borough
North West Group	Hillingdon
North Group	Haringey
North East Group	Waltham Forest
South East Group	Croydon
South West Group	Merton

13.4.3 Assistance could include the shared use of vehicles, equipment and personnel and could extend to other authorities, outside the group, which are willing to assist.

Section 14

14. OTHER ASSISTANCE

- 14.1 Voluntary Aid Societies (VAS)
- 14.1.1 There are numerous VAS which can contribute towards the successful outcome of an incident. Their support at an event can often alleviate some pressure on the statutory bodies by providing humanitarian services. This is especially so during the consolidation and recovery phases when fire, police and ambulance personnel are fully deployed elsewhere.
- 14.1.2 Listed below are some of the more regularly used societies under the emergency service that initiates them:
- 14.2 London Fire Brigade
- Salvation Army
- 14.3 London Ambulance Service
- British Association of Immediate Care (BASICS)
 - British Red Cross Society
 - St John Ambulance Brigade
- 14.4 Police
- Women's Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS)
 - First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY)
 - Church Army/London Churches Major Incident Plan
- 14.4.1 On arrival the VAS should report to the Scene Access Control prior to going to the RVP.
- 14.5 Utility companies
- 14.5.1 The utility companies can be mobilised by any of the emergency services and will normally be co-ordinated by police in the first instance.
- 14.5.2 They are able to control gas, water and electrical supplies. They can also provide communications facilities.
- 14.6 Military assistance
- 14.6.1 This is fully covered in Appendix D.

Section 15

15. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

- 15.1 Welfare
- 15.1.1 In the immediate aftermath of an incident it will be enough for most individuals to take part in close discussions with their peers guided by their close supervisors. Opportunity must be allowed for this purpose.
- 15.1.2 For some people, however, this may not be enough. Those who are particularly traumatised will require skilled professional help and this is now provided by all the services involved. Arrangements for this must be made in a way that ensures confidentiality and overcomes the cultural resistance in the emergency services to such a step.
- 15.2 Debriefing
- 15.2.1 At some stage, when the incident has ended, each of the services and agencies involved in the incident will hold a series of debriefings. Initially these will be confined to each particular service, but later a multi-agency debrief will be held and lessons learnt incorporated into this Manual and other service manuals, as appropriate.
- 15.2.2 The thrust of any such debriefs would be to identify areas for improvement in procedures, equipment and systems. They should not be forums for criticising the performance of others.
- 15.2.3 Debriefs should not interfere with or comment on investigations into the incident carried out by investigative or judicial authorities.
- 15.2.4 It is important to realise that such debriefs and related documents would be disclosable to individuals involved in legal proceedings.

Section 16

16. MEDIA LIAISON

- 16.1 Introduction
- 16.1.1 A major incident involving the joint work of the emergency services in the Capital will inevitably attract significant and sustained interest from both national and international media.
- 16.1.2 It is important that in dealing with the vociferous demands of journalists, press officers from the emergency services liaise and consult effectively with each other whilst respecting the differing roles of their individual services.
- 16.2 Holding statements
- 16.2.1 Once a major incident has been declared all the emergency services involved will be under pressure to provide an immediate statement. At the earliest opportunity a holding statement will be agreed and disseminated by the police press officer.
- 16.2.2 Police press staff will then contact their counterparts in the other emergency services' press offices to make them aware of the statement and in turn be informed of the information they are releasing to the media. Care should be taken that the statements are not contradictory and do not impinge upon or undermine the actions of the other services.
- 16.2.3 No information should be provided to the news media in relation to a terrorist incident without authority of the Anti-Terrorist Branch. An MPS *aide-mémoire* outlines the policy.
- 16.3 Liaison on scene
- 16.3.1 Press officers attending the scene of the incident should seek out their counterparts at the earliest opportunity and establish regular liaison so that contentious or conflicting information can be clarified before release to the media. This information should then be passed to their individual press offices.
- 16.4 Other agencies
- 16.4.1 If the local authority is involved in dealing with the incident and sends a press officer to the scene he or she should be incorporated into the press officer liaison process. Alternatively press officers from local authorities can liaise by telephone to be informed of any media statements which have a direct bearing on their organisation. Similarly, and depending on the nature of the major incident, police press officers will consult with their counterparts at other agencies such as the British Airports Authority at Heathrow and British Gas.
- 16.5 Gold and silver co-ordinating group meetings
- 16.5.1 Ideally a police press officer will attend both gold and silver co-ordinating group meetings. Likewise it may also be necessary for senior public affairs or media and communications personnel from the other emergency services to attend the gold group meetings. It is likely that LAS and LFB press officers will also attend the silver co-ordinating group meetings.
- 16.5.2 The police press officer – in consultation with police gold or silver – will take the lead on the content of subsequent media statements about the incident as a whole. However, it is important that each emergency service has the opportunity to ensure the media is aware of their front-line staff's activities.

- 16.6 Casualty figures
- 16.6.1 Confirmed casualty figures may only be released after consultation with police gold via his or her press officer or the Press Bureau. It is important that only one set of casualty figures should be released at one time. If the number of casualties involved in an incident rises over a period of time then all the services' press officers should refrain from giving updated figures until they have been cleared by police gold.
- 16.6.2 LAS press officers may confirm the general nature of types of injuries – unless police specifically request them not to – and the hospitals to which they are taken, but the numbers of fatalities and those seriously injured should only be given when cleared by police gold.
- 16.6.3 There may be circumstances when police specifically request LAS not to release the name and location of the hospital(s) to which casualties have been taken. Although unusual this could arise in relation to alleged criminals/suspects and potential witnesses.
- 16.7 Joint press office
- 16.7.1 If the incident is of a sufficiently serious nature, ie involving a high number of casualties and/or continuing rescue operations and it is likely to run beyond 12 hours, then consideration will be given to setting up a joint press office.
- 16.8 Joint press briefings
- 16.8.1 If the emergency services consider it beneficial to hold a joint press briefing the senior police press officer at the scene will liaise with the relevant silvers and their press officers to agree a suitable format and identify any contentious issues and how they can be dealt with.
- 16.8.2 The following division of areas of responsibility is suggested for the briefing:
- 16.8.3 Police* – Overall response to the incident; the number of casualties; how the emergency services coped/are coping; Casualty Bureau telephone number (if issued); any criminal investigations (except incidents on the railway); local disruption (past and continuing); praise for local people who may have assisted in rescue operations; heroic actions by police officers.
- 16.8.4 LFB – The rescue operation; how many people were trapped and in what circumstances; the level of its response in terms of appliances and personnel; what equipment was needed to free people and (where relevant) specific information related to flooding, fires or chemical incidents; heroic actions by fire officers.
- 16.8.5 LAS – The nature and seriousness of those injured; where casualties were taken; how many ambulances and medical staff were involved; whether HEMS (air ambulance) was used; heroic actions by ambulance personnel.
- 16.8.6 BTP (incidents on railway only) – Details of any criminal investigation; disruption to the railway; details about potential public inquiries; heroic actions by BTP and railway staff.
- 16.9 Media centres
- 16.9.1 If the incident is on a large scale and is likely to attract a significant media presence for days or even weeks, press officers should consider whether it would be beneficial to establish a media centre near the scene.
- * The City of London Police has mechanisms in place with the MPS, in the event of either a cross-border incident or where assistance is requested from either police service, in relation to staffing Casualty Bureau or providing operational help. In the event of a major incident there would be full co-operation and assistance to and from the City of London Police.

- 16.9.2 Such a centre gives journalists a base to operate from, shelter from the elements and (ideally) provides toilet and refreshment facilities. The advantages to the emergency services include improved communications and speedy organisation of briefings and interviews.
- 16.9.3 Local authorities keep lists of available buildings in their areas and will assist in identifying a suitable venue such as a school or church hall, preferably with a large exterior area where heavy equipment such as outside broadcasting units can be parked.
- 16.10 Debrief
- 16.10.1 Heads of the emergency services' media departments will decide if the incident warrants a post-incident debrief with the relevant press officers who were involved. If such a debrief is held representatives from the various press offices should consider producing a briefing note for their colleagues, evaluating media coverage and identifying best practice and any lessons that have been learned which could assist press officers attending similar incidents in the future.

Section 17

17. OCCUPIERS RESPONSE TO AN INCIDENT

- 17.1.1 It is to be expected that any occupier of premises within a cordoned area, be they residential or business occupiers, would expect to gain access to their premises as soon as possible.
- 17.1.2 Similarly, the police will wish to restore as much normality as possible as quickly as they can. This, however, is subject to two constraints:
- 17.1.3 The area around a major incident is a potential crime scene and the police and other investigators need to carry out a painstaking enquiry to gain material evidence. This could take some time, and during that period, people will be excluded from the area so that vital evidence is not lost.
- 17.1.4 Damage caused by the incident may make the area unsafe to enter. The local authority would exercise its powers under the Building Act to remove those imminent dangers that represent a major safety hazard. It may be considered unsafe to allow owners to move in and attempt to deal with their properties simultaneously. In such cases, in the interest of public safety, the local authority may engage approved contractors to board up and commence repair work.
- 17.2 The inner cordon
- 17.2.1 An inner cordon may well be in place for a prolonged period. However, the boundaries could be redrawn once the search for evidence has been completed, but the immediate area may be out of bounds for days or in some instances weeks.
- 17.2.2 After a time, the police may, subject to advice from the local authority surveyor, allow a limited number of people to enter their premises to undertake damage assessment or retrieval of some items for a few minutes or hours.
- 17.3 The outer cordon
- 17.3.1 The police will aim to keep drawing in the outer cordon so that, at any time, only areas that have yet to be cleared for safety are within it. As premises are progressively freed from the cordon occupiers will need to be on hand to secure their premises as soon as they are released.
- 17.3.2 The police, assisted by the local authority, will ensure that occupiers likely to be affected are given sufficient advance notice of the movement of the cordon boundaries.

APPENDIX A

INCIDENTS ON RAILWAYS

- A.1 Police inter-service co-operation
- A.1.1 The following section outlines an agreement that has been reached nationally between BTP and all Home Office forces. It repeats principles of responsibility which have worked well in the past, but which should be considered flexible as circumstances demand.
- A.1.2 All officers arriving at the scene will report to the senior officer present. That officer, whether from BTP, MPS or COLP will perform the function of police silver. Where the first supervisor to arrive is from the MPS or COLP, it is recommended that the first BTP officer to arrive be appointed as liaison officer, where their specialist knowledge will prove useful.
- A.1.3 It is essential that the police response between the local force and BTP is co-ordinated so that there are no wasted resources or duplication of roles.
- A.1.4 The first officer of inspector rank or above from either force will assume the role of silver, taking responsibility for the initial co-ordination and deployment of resources from each force.
- A.1.5 On the arrival of their counterpart from the other force they will work together, forming a team that ensures the resources, equipment and communications of both forces are used in the most effective way.
- A.1.6 In broad terms, the responsibility of each force is:
BTP on site, MPS or COLP off site. The specific responsibilities below are suggested as a guide and it is emphasised that just as each incident and the resources available will be different in each case so flexibility, discussion and mutual co-operation is essential to ensure the co-ordinated response discussed earlier.

A.2	Police responsibilities	
	Responsibility	Force
	Overall incident commander (gold)	Home Office force with BTP senior officer working in conjunction advising on BTP/railway matters and present at co-ordinating group meetings.
	Investigation	Except in the case of terrorism or murder, BTP will be responsible for investigating the incident. Where an incident is of such a magnitude or there are special reasons whereby a joint team should be formed, this will be done after discussions between senior officers of both forces.
	Inner cordon and matters on railway property	BTP
	Outer cordon	MPS/COLP
	Removal of bodies	The removal of all bodies from the scene must be co-ordinated by MPS or COLP whichever service effects the removal.
	Mortuary and so on	MPS/COLP
	Casualty Bureau and identification	MPS/COLP – BTP liaison
	Property of deceased	MPS/COLP
	Property from scene	BTP
	Press/media	Joint response through co-ordinating group
	Traffic (road)	MPS/COLP
	Hospital documentation necessary	MPS/COLP with BTP assistance if

APPENDIX B

AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS

- B.1 Introduction
- B.1.1 A major air incident is by its very nature an extremely sudden and catastrophic event placing all the organisations concerned with the response under intense pressure. The scale of such events often crosses administrative boundaries and involves a massive and lengthy recovery operation.
- B.1.2 Major incidents involving aircraft that occur within airfield boundaries will involve a local response based upon CAA directions.
- B.2 Specific site hazards
- B.2.1 A major air accident will produce a toxic environment at the scene and all services responding should be aware of the need for extra attention to the identification of potential hazards and the protection of their staff. A crashed aircraft should be approached from an upwind direction whether there is a fire or not, due to the potential spread of toxic substances.
- B.2.2 In addition to the LFB, both the AAIB and RAF are able to advise on potential hazards from crashed aircraft and the materials present in specific aircraft types. The Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Flight at RAF St Athan, Wales, maintains a database for all UK military aircraft. They can fax hazard data sheets to any emergency service on request to their Task Control: 01446 798018.
- B.3 Organisations involved
- Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB)**
- B.3.1 The AAIB investigates all civil aircraft accidents that occur in the UK and helps in the investigation of military accidents at the request of the Ministry of Defence. There are a number of statutory powers associated with this role through the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 1989. These regulations gave the AAIB powers of investigation relating to the management of the scene. Close liaison between the AAIB investigators and the emergency services at the scene is essential at the earliest possible opportunity.
- B.3.2 Police will be responsible for contacting the AAIB on being informed of an incident. The initial AAIB response to a major air accident will consist of a small team of pilots and engineers who will work with RAF pathologists, where necessary. The police investigation will be carried out in close co-operation with that of the AAIB.
- British Airways Emergency Procedures Information Centre (EPIC)**
- B.3.3 EPIC acts as central airline information co-ordinating point. It collates information from airline services worldwide, including details of all passengers, crew and baggage. Most airlines operating through the UK subscribe to EPIC, which is situated at Heathrow.
- B.3.4 EPIC acts as an information centre following an incident and handles a large number of telephone calls that might otherwise be directed to the police Casualty Bureau. EPIC documentation is identical to the National Casualty Bureau paperwork to ease enquiries.
- Royal Air Force (RAF)**
- B.3.5 The RAF will deal with post-crash recovery for all military fixed wing aircraft accidents and has the capability to help with civilian incidents, where requested, particularly with wreckage removal in line with AAIB guidance. The unit involved is the Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Flight based at RAF St Athan in Wales. RAF Search and Rescue resources may be alerted by calling the Air Rescue Co-ordination Centre (Kinloss) Duty Officer: 01343 836001/2/3 or 5.

Royal Navy (RN)

- B.3.6 The RN will deal with all military rotary wing aircraft crashes. The unit is the Mobile Aircraft Servicing Unit based at RNAY Fleetlands, Gosport, Hants.

APPENDIX C

RIVER THAMES INCIDENTS

- C.1 Introduction
- C.1.1 There are many differences in the response required between land and river-based incidents not the least of which being the culture of mariners and river users. For instance, there is a common law duty on the master of a vessel to go to the assistance of another vessel or person in distress. Public involvement may thus play a greater role than would otherwise be expected in a land-based incident.
- C.1.2 The tidal nature of the River Thames leads to complications in that the location and the area of an incident will inevitably change due to the movement of the tide in its ebb, flow and height. Even in non-tidal reaches, the river current will have a similar effect. All this varies with time, weather conditions and season. Hence the expression ‘search and rescue’ (SAR) which implies that the first problem the emergency services have in an incident is locating and securing the scene.
- C.1.3 Special conditions and therefore special procedures apply to search and rescue on the River Thames, its creeks and tributaries. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is the co-ordinating authority for the UK SAR Region and would normally be responsible for the activation of civil SAR response to vessels or persons in need of assistance on all UK tidal waters. However, on the River Thames above Canvey Island the Port of London Authority (PLA), as laid down in the formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two organisations, undertakes this task on its behalf. The respective roles of the MCA, police and fire service are described in various other Memoranda of Understanding which have been endorsed by the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) and the Home Office.
- C.2 Geographic responsibility
- C.2.1 The emergency services and other organisations have different geographic responsibilities on the River Thames.
- C.2.2 The LAS and LFB have responsibility for Greater London only. Their area of responsibility stretches therefore from the London boroughs of Richmond-on-Thames (north bank) and Kingston-upon-Thames (south bank) in the west, to Havering (north bank) and Bexley (south bank) in the east.
- C.2.3 The Metropolitan Police District (MPD) shares the eastern boundary, but extends to Staines Bridge in the west, this area being administered by Elmbridge and Spelthorne districts of Surrey County Council.
- C.2.4 The City of London Police (COLP) has no water-borne response, but is responsible for the north bank of the River Thames between Tower Hill and Temple Place. It is also responsible for the whole of Blackfriars, London and Tower Bridges, and Southwark Bridge and the Blackfriars and Cannon Street Railway Bridges to the centre line of the river.
- C.2.5 There are 16 riparian London boroughs and the Corporation of London which are responsible for the embankment of their respective stretches of the River Thames. Their chief involvement would probably be the provision of rest centres and other land-based support services, including SAR provision, mentioned in the Major Incident Plan.
- C.3 Navigation authorities
- C.3.1 The River Thames is tidal from its estuary to Teddington Lock. The Port of London Authority (PLA) is the navigation and conservancy authority for this tidal part of the Thames. Upstream of Teddington Lock the river is non-tidal and the Environment Agency (EA) is the navigation

authority. The EA is also responsible for flood defences, fisheries, water quality and conservation for the whole of the Thames. Responding to on-water oil pollution from maritime sources below Teddington is the responsibility of the PLA; all other pollution (including chemical) remains the responsibility of the EA.

- C.3.2 The PLA's statutory powers and responsibilities include taking measures to secure safe navigation and as a consequence developing plans to manage any incident or emergency which affects or is likely to affect it. Such plans complement the LESLP procedures and are circulated to river agencies. As previously mentioned the PLA also undertakes the non-statutory task of the co-ordination of SAR incidents on the Thames between Canvey Island and the limit of its jurisdiction at Teddington. Between Crayfordness and Teddington the co-ordination of SAR within a defined zone may be transferred temporarily to the MPS under certain conditions.
- C.3.3 The PLA operates vessel traffic service (VTS) centres on a 24-hour basis at Gravesend (Port Control London) and at the Thames Barrier Navigation Centre at Woolwich (Woolwich Radio). There is radar surveillance from the outer estuary to Greenwich and marine band VHF coverage from the estuary to the inner port limit at Teddington. PLA Harbour Service craft operate through the MP District to Teddington (and are manned on a 24-hour basis upstream to Putney). Salvage, diving and hydrographic resources are based at Gravesend.
- C.3.4 All vessels on the river over 20 metres in length, including both commercial and private craft, are required to maintain a continuous listening watch on Port Operational VHF channels (Channel 14 above Crayfordness). They should report to Woolwich Radio (or Port Control London) as required.

SAR co-ordination and resources

- C.3.5 A Memorandum of Understanding has been agreed between Thames Division (MPS) and the PLA, which deals in detail with the co-ordination of incidents on the river and their respective responsibilities. The MoU underlines the importance of maintaining the safety of navigation outside and around the area of a major incident and it reflects the close working relationship that the two agencies would have in an event of such an incident.
- C.3.6 Thames Division operates a 24-hour emergency response to incidents on the river, including patrol craft and specially equipped vehicles. These monitor both marine and VHF and police radio (999), controlled from a dedicated control and incident room at Wapping. This facility has direct communication links with the Thames Barrier Navigation Centre and CCC-IR.
- C.3.7 The MPS, PLA, EA and LFB have vessels that respond quickly to an incident. One such vessel, as well as assisting with the incident, would normally undertake a control function and maintain contact with its main control at the JESCC.
- C.3.8 Depending upon the circumstances, an ambulance officer should board the control vessel of either of the services, or attend a landing point in order to keep the land-based ambulance control up to date with the number and condition of casualties.
- C.3.9 Water-borne controls should, ideally, be clearly distinguishable from other vessels.
- C.3.10 The LFB have two rapid response vessels, which operate 24 hours and are equipped with both LFB and VHF marine band radios.
- C.3.11 The officer of each service nominated to perform the function of silver will normally operate from the land-based JESCC, although it may be considered useful for them to board one of the vessels to obtain a first-hand view of the scene. The co-ordinating group visiting the scene collectively may best achieve this.
- C.3.12 A SAR Craft and Equipment Compendium is supplied to all emergency services and river agencies giving details of the nature and availability of specialist craft and equipment that can be called upon in an emergency. This Compendium is compiled and maintained by the PLA on behalf of the Tidal Thames SAR Committee.

- C.4 Communications
- C.4.1 The PLA controls the marine band VHF through Woolwich Radio which monitors Channel 14 and the international emergency Channel 16, and Port Control London at Gravesend monitors a range of channels, including 68 and 12 which are the lower river port frequencies. Navigational information is broadcast regularly to river craft and in an emergency warnings and other such information would be given out by this means. If an incident occurs, a separate working channel will normally be allocated for those vessels involved.
- C.5 Grid, river access points and cordons
- C.5.1 Under certain tidal conditions river access is impossible from the land and this will necessitate a water-borne response to incidents.
- C.5.2 Access to the River Thames is limited, particularly at low tide, and consequently a grid system has been developed and access points suitable for embarkation and casualty evacuation identified.
- C.5.3 These points have been selected so that any casualty, no matter how serious his/her injury, can be landed at any state of the tide. Each of the emergency services also uses the system as a locating aid. Copies of the grid system are supplied to each of the emergency services, riparian boroughs and other agencies.
- C.5.4 When an incident occurs on the river the first control room informed (normally MPS/PLA), in consultation with persons at the scene, will plot its location using the grid system and agree a suitable access point(s) with the other emergency services and the PLA/EA. This will form the basis of the land-based response and is the point through which all resources will be channelled into and away from the scene. The access point(s) must be protected in the same way as the scene of an incident on land.
- C.5.5 In a river incident only part of the inner cordon will be land-based with the usual controls over entry. To complete the cordon and to exclude unauthorised vessels, Thames Division and PLA launches will close the river (between two suitable locations such as bridges), following consultation with and the agreement of the duty officer at Woolwich Radio.
- C.5.6 Due to the nature of the tide this exclusion zone may move. It is therefore essential that a liaison officer from the PLA is available to ensure that those from other services attending the incident fully understand the navigational terms used on the river (see Glossary of Marine Terms).
- C.5.7 At low tide long stretches of foreshore may be exposed on to which bodies and other items and debris can be washed up. These areas will need to be protected but the safety of emergency workers must be strictly monitored so that they are not cut off by a rising tide or trapped in soft mud.
- C.6 Body recovery
- C.6.1 Bodies recovered from the water present special problems both to health and in terms of identification. Thames Division has specially trained and equipped officers, including police divers, to carry out this task. Unprotected staff should only be used if it is operationally necessary, eg sheer numbers.

APPENDIX D

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO A MAJOR LONDON INCIDENT

- D.1 Reference
- D.1.1 Military Aid to the Civil Community: A pamphlet for the guidance of Civil Authorities and Organisations (Third Edition: MOD Publications 1989).
- D.2 Policy
- D.2.1 In the event of a major incident, the armed services are authorised to provide all possible assistance to the emergency services where a threat to life exists.
- D.2.2 The immediate assistance the military may be able to provide will depend on what is available at the time of the incident. Whilst no resources are specifically set aside for such assistance, if the incident is sufficiently grave additional troops and assets may be tasked into London.
- D.2.3 Assistance without cost will only be given in a major incident where a threat to life exists. Once that threat has passed charges may be raised.
- D.3 Call out
- D.3.1 If military assistance is required, the following should be contacted in Headquarters London District.
- (a) SO2 G3 Ops/Plans (020) 7414 2326;
SO2 G3 Ops O&D (020) 7414 2444
- (b) During silent hours/weekends the duty officer on (020) 7414 2243.
- D.3.2 All such bids for assistance in a major incident, be they for Army, Air Force or Naval assets, should be made to this Headquarters, therefore providing a single point of contact for the emergency services. London District Headquarters will be responsible for co-ordinating with other services.
- D.4 Initial response
- D.4.1 A military liaison officer may initially go to JESCC to make an initial assessment of the requirement and to consider further options for assistance in conjunction with the emergency service commanders.
- D.4.2 At this stage a decision will be made as to the requirement for a liaison officer to go to the force control room.
- D.5 Troop deployment
- D.5.1 Upon troop deployment the Headquarters will man the Operations Room in Horseguards Parade.
- D.5.2 Troops will deploy as a self-contained formed body under command of an officer or non-commissioned officer initially to the RVP. They will work under the direction of the emergency service bronze commander who has asked for their assistance. At the point of troop deployment to the incident, a military liaison officer will deploy as the military point of contact for the Military Headquarters.

D.6 Co-ordination

D.6.1 Should the circumstances require a further liaison officer at silver, the Military Headquarters will task an officer.

D.6.2 Further representation at the JESCC/co-ordinating group will be decided as the gravity of the incident is assessed and the requirement for continued or additional assistance is considered.

APPENDIX E

GLOSSARY

Ambulance loading point	An area, preferably hard standing, in close proximity to the casualty clearing station, where ambulances can manoeuvre and load patients.
Body collection point (or holding area)	A point close to the scene where the dead can be temporarily kept until transfer to the mortuary. Ideally the premises should be secure, dry, cool and have ample drainage. (See Temporary mortuary.)
Brigade control	The Fire Brigade Command and Mobilising Centre (CMC) at Brigade Headquarters, Lambeth.
CAC	Central Ambulance Control, Waterloo, and Devons Road, Bow.
Casualty	A person directly involved in or affected by the incident (injured, uninjured, deceased or evacuee).
Casualty Bureau.....	Central contact and information point for all records and data relating to casualties.
Casualty clearing station	An area set up at a major incident by the ambulance service in liaison with the medical incident officer to assess, treat and triage casualties and direct their evacuation. (See Triage.)
CCC–IR	Central Command Complex – Information Room at New Scotland Yard.
CCC–SOR	Special Operations Room at New Scotland Yard.
Command Support Centre (CSC).....	Suite at Brigade Headquarters that acts as the special command facility for gold fire during a major incident.
Controlled area	The area contained by the outer cordon that may be divided into geographical sectors.
Cordon	The perimeter of an area, for example the rescue zone or a sector. May be physical or improvised.
EPIC.....	Emergency Procedures Information Centre.
Evacuees’ assembly point.....	A location of safety, near the scene, where evacuees can initially be directed for assembly before being transported to rest centres.
Forward control/command point	A control point/forward command post dealing directly with activity at the scene and the respective emergency service resources at the scene.
Friends and relatives reception centre	Secure area set aside for use by friends and relatives arriving and for interviews with them. This will usually be maintained and operated by the police.

Hospital, receiving	The hospitals to be alerted by the ambulance service to receive casualties in the event of a major incident. The first one will be requested to provide the medical incident officer. Receiving hospitals must be adequately equipped to receive casualties on a 24-hour basis and able to provide, when required, the medical incident officer and a mobile medical/nursing team.
Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC)	The main police, fire brigade and ambulance service control/command units, together with the public utilities and local authority which should be located close to one another and form the focus point from which the incident will be managed.
LUL	London Underground Limited.
Marshalling area	Area to which resources and personnel from all services can be directed to stand by. Fire brigade reliefs may be directed there to be briefed before final deployment by silver fire.
Marshalling officer	Service representative at marshalling area.
Media centre	Central contact point for media enquiries, providing communications and conference facilities and staffed by press officers from all organisations.
Officer of the day (OOD)	A fire brigade divisional officer rostered to perform this duty at the Command Support Centre (CSC) at Brigade Headquarters.
Overall incident commander (gold)	Designated principal officer of each service who assumes the co-ordinating function for the operation as a whole on behalf of their service.
Paramedic	A qualified NHS ambulance person who has obtained the IHCD Certificate in Extended Ambulance Aid Training. They may also be permitted to administer specified drugs.
Police incident officer (PIO)	Silver or ground commander, responsible for decisions at a tactical level.
Police media representative	Senior police appointee chosen by the overall incident commander to be responsible for the release of information on behalf of the police.
Press liaison officer (scene).....	Representatives of each organisation responsible for the initial release of information from the scene of the incident reflecting co-ordinating group policy.
Press liaison point (PLP)	Premises at or adjacent to the scene designated for exclusive use by accredited media representatives and through which official press releases will be issued.

Rendezvous point (RVP)	A point selected by the emergency services as the location for all personnel and vehicles to report to before attending the major incident. It is situated within the outer cordon.
Rendezvous point officer	Police officer responsible for supervision of the RVP.
Rescue zone	The area within the inner cordon.
Rest centre	Premises designated for the temporary accommodation of evacuees.
Sector commander (bronze)	The officer in command of an operational area and having functional responsibility within the controlled area for fire/rescue purposes.
Senior investigating officer (SIO)	Police senior detective officer appointed by gold to assume responsibility for all aspects of the police investigation.
Silver fire/medic/police	The service incident commander on the scene.
Station officer (SOBC)	The operations station officer at Brigade Control responsible for liaison between Control and the officer of the day (OOD).
Survivor reception centre.....	Secure area to which uninjured survivors can be taken for shelter, first aid, interview and documentation.
Temporary mortuary	A site which has been designated by the Coroner as being the mortuary for a particular incident.
Triage	Process of prioritising the evacuation of the injured by the medical or ambulance staff at the casualty receiving station.

APPENDIX F

GLOSSARY OF MARINE TERMS

Above (a point).....	Refers to the river upstream of a reference point, not vertically above it.
Below (a point).....	Refers to the river downstream of a reference point, not physically underneath it.
Downstream (of).....	That portion of the river which is closer to the estuary than the reference point, for example, ‘downstream of Tower Bridge’.
Air draft	The height of a vessel from the water line to the top of its highest structure (mast or superstructure as appropriate).
Bridge clearance	The distance from any nominated point on the underside of a bridge to the water level, at any given state of the tide.
Ebb tide.....	A tide which flows from the river’s source towards its estuary (downstream).
Fairway	The navigational channel.
Flood tide.....	A tide which flows from the river’s estuary towards its source (upstream).
Foreshore	That portion of the river closest to the embankment which is covered by water except at low tide.
Non-tidal Thames	Above Teddington Lock the river is non-tidal and the water level remains constant except as it is affected by water entering the river from its tributaries.
Reach	A continuous stretch of a river that can be looked along between two bends.
Slack water	When the tidal stream is not moving.
Tidal Thames	That length of the river where the water level rises and falls due to tidal action. It extends from the estuary to Teddington Lock.
Upstream (of).....	That portion of the river which is closer to the river’s source than the reference point, for example, ‘upstream of Tower Bridge’.

The above expressions remove the need to use compass points to locate a point that is difficult when the meandering nature of the river is taken into account.

Tidal flow is at its fastest and strongest mid-tide, that is half-way between high and low water. Tidal flow increases and decreases proportionally about the period of maximum flow.